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19811 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 14--CONRMUTION
CPLR 1402: Insolvent defendant may borrow judgment money
pursuant to agreement with plaintiff thus accruing his claim for
contribution
CPLR 1402 entitles a defendant to a claim for contribution
equal to the amount paid by him in excess of his apportioned share
of liability.9 2 While a contribution claim may be asserted prior to
judgment in the main action, it cannot be enforced until the defen-
dant pays more than his equitable share.93 Thus, the main defen-
82 CPLR 1402 (1976) provides:
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess
paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the
injured party;, but no person shall be required to contribute an amount greater
than his equitable share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance
with the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution.
Article 14 of the CPLR as presently codified was amended by ch. 742, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws
1915 (current version at CPLR art. 14 (1976)) to reflect the Court of Appeals' decision in
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole,
the Court held that liability between or among joint tortfeasors may be apportioned accord-
ing to their fault in contributing to the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. See TwELTm ANN. REP. OF TM JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1973),
in TWENTIETH ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE 197, 218-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
TWELFrH REPORT]; The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 170, 184 (1974). Prior to the Dole
decision the CPLR allowed contribution claims between joint tortfeasors where one defen-
dant had paid the injured plaintiff in excess of his pro rata share of liability. CPLR 1402, ch.
308 [1962] N.Y. Laws 1344, as amended by, ch. 388, § 5 [1964] N.Y. Laws 1256 (current
version at CPLR art. 14 (1976)); see CPLR 1401, commentary at 361 (1976). Apportionment
was not permitted, however, because of the "unwillingness of the law as a matter of policy to
make relative value judgments of degrees of culpability among wrongdoers." Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386. See generally W.
PROSSER, HmNDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 305-23 (4th ed. 1971); The Quarterly Survey, 47
ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 148, 185, 186-200 (1972).
83 Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d 362, 369, 361 N.E.2d 974, 979, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328
(1977). CPLR 1403 states that "[a] cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a
separate action or by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action."
CPLR 1403 (1976). Prior to the 1974 revision of article 14, however, if the plaintiff failed to
name a joint tortfeasor as a defendant in the main action, that tortfeasor was unreachable
by the other defendants, for there was no applicable impleader provision. See SIEGEL § 174,
at 214. The present statute allows the main defendant to assert his contribution claim im-
mediately, see Figueroa v. Kahn, 101 Misc. 2d 821, 822, 422 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1979); 2A WK&M 1402.01 at 14-90, but prevents him from enforcing
the claim until he has paid more than his apportioned share. Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d
at 369, 361 N.E.2d at 979, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 328; Cubito v. Kriesberg, 69 App. Div. 2d 738,
746, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583 (2d Dep't 1979); see Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 826, 354
N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974); 2A WK&M 1 1402.01 at 14-90, 14-91; cf.
McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods. Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 204, 208, 239 N.E.2d 340, 341, 292
N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1968) (contribution claim asserted by impleader before change in
statute).
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dant's insolvency will shield a culpable third-party defendant from
liability unless the plaintiff previously asserted a claim against
him. 4 It had been unclear, however, whether a plaintiff could im-
prove his options for recovery through concerted action with the
main defendant.9 5 Recently, in Feldman v. New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation,6 the Supreme Court, Kings County,
held that an insolvent defendant may borrow the judgment money
pursuant to an agreement arranged by the plaintiff, thereby enti-
tling the defendant to enforce his contribution claim against the
otherwise unreachable, but solvent, third-party defendant.9 7
In Feldman, an action was brought against the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation (Hospitals Corporation) to re-
cover on a contribution claim arising from a personal injury action
apportioning liability among the main and third-party defen-
dants.98 Pursuant to the judgment in the tort action the defen-
There is one instance, however, where a main defendant may enforce his contribution
claim without having paid his apportioned share of the judgment. See Rock v. Reed-Pren-
tice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976). In
Reed-Prentice, the plaintiff received from the main defendant, as a settlement, an amount
less than its "judicially fixed" share of liability as determined by the actual judgment. Id. at
40, 346 N.E.2d at 523, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 723. When the defendant sought to enforce its con-
tribution claim, the third-party defendant refused to pay his share, asserting that the main
defendant had failed to pay in excess of its equitable share. Id. The Court, however, held
that a settlement obtained after litigation and judgment "does not preclude [the defendant]
from enforcing the judgment for contribution previously obtained against [the third-party
defendant]." Id. at 41, 346 N.E.2d at 524, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 723. Therefore, although the
defendant had paid less than his apportioned share of the declared judgment, he was per-
mitted to enforce his claim because he paid in excess of the equitable share of the amount
received by the plaintiff. Id. at 41-42, 346 N.E.2d at 524, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24; see CPLR
1402 (1976).
See notes 120 & 122 and accompanying text infra.
95 See CPLR 5230, commentary at 37 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Farrell, Survey of
New York Law-Civil Practice, 29 SYRAcus L. REv. 449, 488-89 (1978).
98 107 Misc. 2d 145, 437 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1981).
Id. at 153-54, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
98 Id. at 148-49, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 494. Alexander Dubicki sustained various injuries as a
result of being hit by an automobile driven by Robert Maresco and owned by Carlo
Maresco. Dubicki v. Maresco, 64 App. Div. 2d 645, 645, 407 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (2d Dep't 1978).
He was treated at New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation's Elmhurst General
Hospital for two days and then moved to a hospital closer to his home. Id. There, under the
supervision of Dr. Joseph Dashefsky, Mr. Dubicki received extensive treatment, but lost
complete use of his right leg. Id. Mr. Dubicki and his wife filed suit, asserting a claim in
negligence against the Marescos and one in medical malpractice against Dr. Dashefsky. Id.
After Dr. Dashefsky impleaded the Health and Hospital Corporation, the Marescos cross-
claimed against it seeking contribution. Id, at 645-46, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 69. The jury returned
a $835,000 verdict against all the defendants and the third-party defendant. Id. After
modificaton by the appellate division, liability was apportioned as follows: The Marescos
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dants therein, the Marescos, owed $534,400 to the original plain-
tiffs, the Dubickis.9e  Impleaded by one of the defendants, 100 the
Hospitals Corporation was found liable for $450,900 of this
amount.101 Except for a $25,000 liability insurance policy, the
Marescos were insolvent. Since the Hospitals Corporation, as
third-party defendant, was obligated to contribute only the
amount actually paid by the Marescos in excess of $83,500, their
apportioned share of liability,10 2 the Dubickis' judgment remained
largely unsatisfied.103 In order to obtain payment, the Dubickis ar-
ranged a series of transactions whereby one Feldman loaned to the
Marescos the entire amount outstanding on the judgment.1°4 The
Marescos then paid the Dubickis and received a full release from
the judgment. 10 5 In return, Feldman was assigned the Marescos'
right to enforce the contribution claim against the Hospitals Cor-
poration and obtained Dubicki's guaranty of the loan in the event
he could not recover.108 This action resulted after the Hospitals
Corporation refused to pay Feldman on the third-party claim.10 7
In an opinion by Justice Aronin, the Supreme Coirt, Kings
County, sustained the validity of the agreements and held the Hos-
pitals Corporation liable on the third-party judgment. 0 8 Recogniz-
10%; Dr.. Dashefsky 36%; and Health and Hospital Corporation 54%. Id. at 647, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 70.
" 107 Misc. 2d at 146, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Dr. Dashefsky, the second defendant in the
tort action, paid his share directly to the Dubickis, thereby reducing the Maresco's share of
liability to 64% of the total amount. Id. Although the Marsecos were found to be only 10%
at fault, they were the initial tortfeasors and thus were liable for the entire judgment. Id.
100 See note 98 supra.
101 107 Misc. 2d at 146, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
1o Id. at 147, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
103 107 Misc. 2d at 147, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
104 Id. at 148, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 493. According to the agreement among the Dubickis, the
Marescos and Robert Feldman, Mr. Feldman loaned to the Marescos $546,202, an amount
equal to the remaining judgment plus interest. Id.
100 Id. The Marescos paid by a check which the Dubickis deposited in the escrow
account maintained by their lawyer. Id. The Dubickis then executed an unconditional "gen-
eral release and a full satisfaction of the judgment against the Marescos." Id.
10 Id. The Marescos gave Feldman a demand promissory note in the amount of the
loan plus 10% interest per annum. Id. Payment of the note was guaranteed by the Dubickis.
Id. at 148, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94.
' Id. at 149, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 494. As an affirmative defense to Feldman's suit, the
Hospitals Corporation asserted that the arrangement was violative of public policy and that
it constituted a collusive scheme intended to circumvent the Klinger prohibition against
direct liability running from the third-party defendant to the plaintiff. Id.
108 Id. at 149-54, 437 N.Y.S. at 494-96.
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ing that in Klinger v. Dudley,"' the Court of Appeals gave a literal
interpretation to CPLR 1402 by requiring that payment first be
made by the main defendant, the Feldman court noted that ineq-
uitable results might occur when the defendant is unable to pay an
amount greater than his apportioned share of liability.110 Justice
Aronin reasoned, however, that the Klinger rule is justified since it
ensures that the third-party defendant's contribution will not be
kept by the main defendant without being made to the plaintiff.,,
Furthermore, the court observed that, unless the main defendant
can satisfy the entire judgment, the third-party defendant is the
beneficiary of the Klinger principle in cases where the plaintiff
fails to proceed directly against it. 2 In Justice Aronin's view,
Klinger does not prevent a plaintiff, faced with an uncollectible
judgment, from taking concerted action with the defendant to ar-
range the necessary financing to fulfill the third-party defendant's
condition precedent to liability.113 Notwithstanding that the defen-
dants incurred no out-of-pocket expense, the court stated that the
sole requirement of Klinger is that payment come directly from
the defendant. 4 Thus, Justice Aronin concluded that the agree-
ment was not collusive and that it achieved equitable results con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the Klinger decision." 5
It is submitted that the Feldman decision subverts the policy
109 41 N.Y.2d 362, 361 N.E.2d 974, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1977).
110 107 Misc. 2d at 150, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 494. The result in Klinger, stated the court,
"can and does produce inequitable results for the parties involved." Id. For example, Justice
Aronin added, it penalizes the plaintiff for his attorney's failure to proceed against all the
proper parties. Id.
- Id. at 151, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495. The Feldman court noted that a claim for contribu-
tion is equivalent to a claim for partial indemnification, id. (citing Zillman v. Meadowbrook
Hosp. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 726, 729-30, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 45 App. Div. 2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1974)), which is
based on the concept that the main defendant should not be made to suffer because of the
wrongs of the third-party defendant. 107 Misc. 2d at 151, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495. The court
noted that injustice can result where the Klinger rule is applied to an insolvent defendant,
for not only will the plaintiff remain unpaid, but the defendant also could remain "subject
to continuing income and/or property executions or other enforcement devices to pay off
this additional liability." Id.
"I Id. at 151, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
13 Id. at 153, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
114 Id.
15 Id. The court also addressed the Hospitals Corporation's assertion that the
Marescos had not really paid the Dubickis because the payment was held in escrow and
could be returned to Feldman if the result of the suit was not in his favor. Id.; see note 105
supra. The court responded that what the Dubickis did with their money was irrelevant and
of no concern to the Marescos. Id.
[Vol. 55:552
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considerations underlying the contribution statute. As acknowl-
edged by the Feldman court, CPLR 1402 is designed to prevent
unjust enrichment of the third-party defendant arising from the
payment by the main defendant of an amount exceeding his appor-
tioned share of liability.11 The Klinger rule furthers that aim by
limiting the defendant's right to recover until actual payment of
this amount.117 It is suggested that, although not addressed by
Klinger, 1 8 an agreement of the type sanctioned in Feldman is not
consistent with these underlying principles. When a defendant has
been released from liability before he has paid at least his share of
the judgment, any amount later paid by the third-party defendant
should not be deemed to compensate for an expense incurred by
the main defendant. The third-party defendant is not unjustly en-
riched until such time as the defendant incurs a personal loss be-
yond his apportioned share of liability.119 Carried to its logical ex-
treme, the reasoning of the Feldman court would validate such an
agreement even where the defendant is totally released from liabil-
ity. In such a case, there is no unjust enrichment, and hence, no
I's Id. at 151, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495. CPLR 1404 also demonstrates that the Dole Court
did not change the plaintiff's right to fully recover from any initial tortfeasor. The statute
states that "[n]othing contained [herein] shall impair the rights of any person entitled to
damages under existing law." CPLR 1404(a) (1976); see TWELTH REPORT, supra note 92, at
221-22; CPLR 1404, commentary at 381 (1976).
In Dole, the Court accepted for the first time the principle that "[t]here are circum-
stances which would justify "apportionment of responsibility between third-party plaintiff
and third-party defendant, in effect a partial indemnification." 30 N.Y.2d at 147, 282
N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386. In 1974, when article 14 of the CPLR was drastically
altered to reflect Dole, see TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 92, at 218-19, the New York Legis-
lature also expressed its approval of relative fault. The beneficiary of these rules was clearly
the defendant. Prior to this revision in the law, a defendant had no recourse against a joint
tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff in the main action. See SIEGEL at 214. It is the
tortfeasor-joint, concurrent, successive and independent-who has the right to enforce a
claim for contribution. E.g., McMahon v. Butler, 73 App. Div. 2d 197, 198, 426 N.Y.S.2d
326, 327 (3d Dep't 1980); see CPLR 1401, commentary at 362-63 (1976). Because the plain-
tiff has been denied the right to collect a judgment directly from the third-party defendant,
where the main defendant is insolvent, the plaintiff's recovery will fall far short of the
court's declared amount. Only the defendant can recover from the third-party defendant,
unless the defendant allows the plaintiff to step into his place. Although a court probably
would not allow direct assignment to the plaintiff of the defendant's right to collect from
the third-party defendant, there seems to be no difference when the plaintiff finds someone
to substitute for him.
117 107 Misc. 2d at 151, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
116 See CPLR 5230, commentary at 37 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Farrell, Survey of
New York Law-Civil Practice, 29 SYRAcusE L. REv. 449, 488-89 (1978).
119 See Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 827, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356, 359 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1974).
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apparent reason for allowing contribution under CPLR 1402.
Additionally, there are a number of other issues which the
Feldman court should have considered before permitting this type
of arrangement. Usually, when a party is impleaded, the plaintiff
may amend his complaint pursuant to CPLR 1009 to assert any
claim he has against that party.120 Where the plaintiff's attorney
fails through his negligence to properly assert a direct claim, the
plaintiff has an adequate remedy in professional malpractice. 121
Furthermore, where the failure to amend stems from a statutory
limitation, such as worker's compensation or notice of claim, it is
not clear whether a court should sustain an agreement of this
type. 1 22 If the third-party defendant is the plaintiff's employer, ac-
ceptance of a loan agreement initiated by a plaintiff-employee and
an insolvent defendant permits the employee to circumvent the ex-
110 CPLR 1009 provides: "Within twenty days after service of the third-party com-
plaint, the plaintiff may amend his complaint without leave of court to assert against the
third-party defendant any claim he has against the third-party defendant." CPLR 1009
(1976).
1 E.g., Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d at 368, 361 N.E.2d at 979, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
111 Two possible statutory limitations to amending a complaint pursuant to CPLR
1009, see note 120 supra, are significant in the contribution context. The first is N.Y. WoRK.
Comp. LAw § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) which provides in pertinent part: "the liabil-
ity of an employer [under this chapter] shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability
whatsoever.. ." to the injured employee and his privies. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Long, 41
N.Y.2d 219, 221, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (1976). Because of the exclu-
sive nature of the statute, an injured employee is barred from asserting any claim against
his employer. See N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 11, commentary at 105 (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). When his employer is impleaded by the main defendant as a third-party defendant,
therefore, the employee is unable to use CPLR 1009 to amend his complaint. E.g., Klinger v.
Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d at 368, 361 N.E.2d at 979, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
A second statutory limitation on CPLR 1009 is the notice of claim requirement embod-
ied in section 50-e of the GML which provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law
as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special proceeding
against a public corporation... or any officer, appointee or employee thereof, the
notice of claim shall comply with and be served ... within ninety days after the
claim arises.
GML § 50-e (1977). The purpose of this provisions is to give timely notice to a municipality
of the claim against it so that it can adequately prepare its defense. E.g., Ziecker v. Town of
Orchard Park, 70 App. Div. 2d 422, 427, 421 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (4th Dep't 1979); Leone v.
City of Utica, 66 App. Div. 2d 463, 468, 414 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (4th Dep't 1979), af'd, 49
N.Y.2d 811, 403 N.E.2d 964, 426 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1980); Worrell v. City of New York, 101
Misc. 2d 271, 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1979). If a plaintiff
fails to comply with the provision when he wishes to sue a municipality, his claim will be
defeated. See 2999 Realty Corp. v. Hallen Constr. Corp., 95 Misc. 2d 227, 406 N.Y.S.2d 951
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1978).
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clusive recovery feature of the worker's compensation statute.123
Also left unresolved by the Feldman court is the possibility of suc-
cessive contribution claims by the defendant. The potential for
harassment of the third-party defendant in this situation has been
noted where a small incremental amount in excess of his appor-
tioned share is loaned to the defendant. 124 Moreover, while a third-
party provided the loan proceeds in Feldman, the court's rationale
would be applicable equally to cases in which the funds came di-
rectly from the plaintiff. In either case, the incentives for collusion
are great where the named tortfeasor is insolvent. Consequently,
the effect, if not the spirit of the Klinger rule, will be diminished
substantially by permitting a Feldman-type agreement.
Ellen R. Dunkin
ARTICLE 44-TRnLL MOTIONS
CPLR 4401: Dismissal of cross-claim for contribution unwar-
ranted despite cross-claimant's opening statement exculpating
codefendants
A motion to dismiss a cause of action based on admissions in
the opening statements of counsel which effectively preclude recov-
ery may be made pursuant to CPLR 4401.125 Although the statute
12 See note 122 supra.
124 See CPLR 5230, commentary at 37-38 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Successive
claims would occur if the court allowed for assertion of the contribution claim through a
"bucket brigade" approach. Id. at 37. This system of recovery applies where a defendant
already has paid his exact share of the judgment. Each additional dollar he pays is one over
and above his share and therefore collectible from the third-party defendant. Once the de-
fendant collects that dollar, he can pay the plaintiff and thus, has another claim against the
third-party defendant. Id. Rather than require the defendant to assert one contribution
claim at a time, another commentator has postulated that the defendant may be entitled to
receive the full amount owing once he pays just one dollar. See WK&M I 1402.01a, at 14-94.
15 CPLR 4401 (1963) provides:
Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon
the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after
the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such
cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.
Although not included expressly, dismissal on the basis of admissions in a counsel's opening
statement is within the purview of the statute. SEcoND RE. at 306; see CPLR 4401, com-
mentary at 212 (1963). The practice of using the motion in this fashion is well established in
New York. See, e.g., Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 356, 65 N.E. 169, 171 (1902);
Schaefer v. Karl, 43 App. Div. 2d 747, 747, 350 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (2d Dep't 1973);
Denenfeld v. Baumann, 40 App. Div. 502, 503, 58 N.Y.S. 110, 110 (1st Dep't 1899). Indeed,
